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Abstract: 
Emission allowances are often distributed for free in an early phase of a cap-and-trade scheme 
(grandfathering) to reduce adverse effects on the profitability of firms. If the grandfathering 
scheme is phased out over time, firms may nevertheless relocate to countries with a lower 
carbon price once the competitive disadvantage of their home industry becomes sufficiently 
high. We show that this is not necessarily the case. A temporary grandfathering policy can be 
a sufficient instrument to avert relocation in the long run, even if immediate relocation would 
be profitable in the absence of grandfathering. A necessary condition for this is that the permit 
price triggers investments in low-carbon technologies or abatement capital. 
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1. Introduction 
Suppose there are two countries, A and B. Country A introduces a cap-and-trade scheme, 
while greenhouse gas emissions in country B remain free of charge. Consider the location 
choice of a firm initially located in country A. If the carbon price in A (induced by the cap-
and-trade scheme) is sufficiently high, the firm may decide to relocate to country B. However, 
if (part of) the emission allowances are distributed to the firm for free, relocation may become 
unprofitable, at least for a certain period of time. This holds if the amount of allowances 
allocated to the firm for free is sufficiently high to compensate the firm for the competitive 
disadvantage of its home industry caused by the carbon price. 
The goal of this paper is to investigate under what conditions the firm’s location decision may 
be affected by the free allocation of emission allowances (grandfathering) also in the long run, 
assuming that grandfathering is only a temporary policy option and must be phased out over 
time. The main contribution of this paper is to identify conditions under which temporary 
grandfathering can permanently avert relocation, and how policies that try to achieve this goal 
in a cost-efficient way should be designed. 
A central aspect is the role of sunk fixed costs of investments in energy-saving equipment or 
low-carbon technologies. The idea is as follows. If a sufficient amount of allowances is 
allocated to the firm for free, it will continue to produce in country A for a certain period of 
time. During this period, it faces the permit price in this country. This makes it profitable for 
the firm to build up some “abatement capital” that lowers the firm’s expenditure on 
certificates or allows the firm to sell (part of) the grandfathered allowances as long as it 
continues to produce in A. The optimal investment in abatement capital is increasing in the 
length of the period during which the firm plans to stay. Conversely, given a rise in the 
abatement capital stock of the firm, the optimal length of this period increases. Under some 
conditions, the strength of this positive feedback effect can make temporary grandfathering a 
sufficient policy instrument to permanently affect the firm’s location choice. As shown in this 
paper, a necessary condition for this is that the fixed installation costs of the firm’s abatement 
capital stock are sunk and, hence, can not be recovered when the firm relocates. 
Another crucial aspect concerns the timing of the grandfathering policy. In order to avert 
relocation in the long run, an initially high rate of grandfathered allowances that declines 
rapidly is generally a less effective tool than a policy that entails a lower rate initially and that 
declines less rapidly. For a given stock of abatement capital, a firm relocates when the share 
of grandfathered allowances falls below a certain threshold. Therefore, in the former case, 
firms tend to “free-ride” the initially generous grandfathering policy, but do not invest a lot in 
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abatement capital and relocate after a short period of time. Hence, in order to avert relocation 
permanently, grandfathering must not be phased-out too quickly. 
The third crucial aspect highlighted in this paper concerns the observability of the firm’s 
output or location choice on the optimal design of a grandfathering policy. In general, 
grandfathering policies should be made contingent on the firm’s location if this is possible, 
and follow an exogenous, pre-defined path instead of being updated to the firm’s emission 
levels over time. This assures that no artificial incentives are created for the firm to raise its 
emissions in order to be allocated more allowances in the future (see Harrison and Radov, 
2002). Furthermore, location-dependent policies lead to a maximum punishment for 
relocation (assuming that the grandfathering rate, then, drops to zero). However, in practice, 
firms may be able to shift only partially to other countries, while leaving e.g. their head-
quarters or final good assembly etc. in country A. This makes the “location” of the firm an 
irrelevant indicator of its productive activity in the home country. Therefore, policy measures 
have been proposed where the free allocation of allowances is conditioned on the firm’s 
output, such as benchmarking or Best Available Technology (BAT) policies (Ahman and 
Zetterberg, 2002). However, these policies require a reliable measure for the firm’s output, 
that in many cases does not exist when firms may relocate partially to other counties (e.g. by 
outsourcing). Hence, policies that are contingent on the firm’s output are often not feasible. 
We, therefore, analyze whether second-best policies exist that are contingent only on the 
firm’s emissions (that are easier to monitor), rather than location or output. To tackle this 
issue, we first analyze policies that are, by assumption, linear in the firm’s emission level. 
Hence, if the firm emits twice as much CO2, then it is allocated twice as many certificates for 
free. It is shown that linear policies can be sufficient to avert relocation. However, due to the 
artificial incentives they create to raise emissions, the range of parameter values where this is 
possible is more narrow than in the case where policies are contingent on the firm’s location. 
An alternative policy approach is to use non-monotonic allocation schemes where a fixed 
emissions target is defined
1
 for the firm by the regulator, and the amount of allowances 
allocated to the firm for free decreases both when it produces higher or lower emissions than 
under its reference level. This removes the artificial incentives to raise emissions in country 
A, and yet maintains the punishment for shifting production to B. As shown in this paper, 
such policies can sometimes be used to implement the first-best solution when the firm’s 
location and output are not observable to the policy-maker. However, a necessary condition 
for this is that the firm does not find it profitable to relocate its production partially to country 
                                                 
1
 E.g. using data on the firm’s past emissions and final output production. 
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B, e.g. due to complementarities in production. Otherwise, the firm may achieve its reference 
emission level without investing in low-carbon technologies or abatement capital.  
The idea that grandfathering can be used as an incentive device to avert relocation in the long 
run via a lock-in effect of investments in low-carbon technologies or abatement capital, 
appears to be novel in the literature. However, the model introduced in this paper is related to 
contributions from the literature with a different focus. E.g., Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003) 
analyze the location decision of a monopolist when a carbon tax is introduced in its home 
country. The authors compare a situation where the regulator sets the tax first and then the 
monopolist invests in abatement capital with a situation where the tax is chosen after the 
investment is undertaken. They refer to the former case as time-inconsistent, and to the latter 
as time-consistent, because in the former case, the regulator has ex post, when the investment 
costs incurred by the monopolist are sunk, an incentive to alter the tax rate. Hence, the authors 
highlight effects of commitment power of the regulator not to deviate from an announced 
policy. In contrast to this, we abstract from time-inconsistency issues, and assume that the 
regulator can credibly commit to a grandfathering policy. 
Hepburn et al. (2006) analyze in a static Cournot framework how large the grandfathering rate 
should be in order to achieve profit neutrality under a cap-and-trade scheme, relative to 
business-as-usual. The authors demonstrate that the grandfathering rate required for profit 
neutrality depends, among other things, on the degree of asymmetry in the market spit. Hence, 
a firm with a larger market share may require a different rate of grandfathered allowances (as 
a percentage of its emissions) than a firm with a smaller market share. In this paper, we do not 
use profit neutrality as a criterion for policy design, and instead analyze whether 
grandfathering schemes can be used as an incentive device to avert relocation. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the 
results. Section 2.1 highlights the role of sunk fixed costs for the effectiveness of a 
grandfathering scheme to avert relocation. Section 2.2. demonstrates the importance of 
timing, and Section 2.3 focuses on the observability of the firm’s location. Section 3 
concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
 
2. Model & Results 
Suppose, a cap-and-trade scheme is implemented in country A at time 0, and the resulting 
carbon price is perfectly predictable and remains constant forever. Let a  be the firm’s 
investment in abatement capital, and let 2
2
aα  be the associated fixed cost. Suppose, any 
investments in abatement capital occur at time 0t = . This is plausible, because the resulting 
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cost savings then accrue over the entire time interval during which the firm remains in country 
A.
2
 Furthermore, assuming continuous time, let tz  be the flow of certificates allocated to the 
firm for free if it remains in A through time t . The value of the flow of grandfathered permits 
at time t  is z tp z , where zp  is the constant price of certificates in country A (from 0t =  
onwards). Let T  be the point in time when the firm relocates from A to B, and note that 
0T =  implies immediate relocation, while T →∞  implies no relocation.3 The discounted 
value of grandfathered permits through time T  is given by 
0
T
t
T z tGF p z e dt
δ−≡ ∫ , where δ  is the 
discount rate for future profits. Throughout the paper, we assume that the regulator announces 
and credibly commits to a grandfathering policy before the firm chooses a  and T . 
Let TΠ  be the maximized present value of the firm’s profit, given that it plans to relocate 
from A to B at time T . Hence, all other variables of the firm (including the investment in 
abatement capital a ) are chosen optimally given T . Assuming that the fixed investment costs 
in abatement capital are sunk, TΠ  can be written as follows:  
 * * 2, , 2
0
( , ) ( )
T
t t T
T A t z T B t T T
T
p a e dt e dt a e F GFδ δ δαπ π
∞
− − −Π = + − − +∫ ∫  (1) 
, where ,A tπ  ( ,B tπ ) denotes the firm’s profit flow in A (B) at time t , F  is a fixed relocation 
cost, and *Ta  the optimized value of a , given that the firm relocates at T . Throughout the 
paper, we assume for simplicity that the market structure and other external conditions (e.g. 
input and output prices) do not change over time, and that all other choice variables of the 
firm (in addition to a ) can be adjusted instantaneously at no additional cost. Therefore, ,A tπ  
and ,B tπ  are constants, and the time subscript can be omitted. 
 
2.1 The role of sunk fixed costs 
In the following, we analyze the role of the fixed installation costs of abatement capital for the 
effectiveness of a grandfathering policy to avert relocation. Only when they are sunk, 
temporary grandfathering can be a sufficient instrument to avert relocation permanently. 
 
                                                 
2
 Hence, the firm has no incentive to delay the investment. Depreciation of the abatement capital stock is 
assumed away for simplicity. The main results in this paper are not affected by this assumption. 
3
 Hence, the firm either relocates its entire production or stays in A. In most of the cases we analyze in this 
paper, this follows directly from the incentives the firm faces: either production is more profitable in A or in B, 
so the firm will either relocate its entire production or stay in A. Only in Section 2.3 where non-linear 
grandfathering schemes are discussed, partial relocation is ruled out by assumption. 
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Proposition 1: 
When the fixed installation costs of abatement capital are sunk, a temporary grandfathering 
policy can be a sufficient instrument to avert relocation permanently if it holds that: 
 * 20 2 ( )GF GF a
α
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞Π − ≤ Π ≤ Π − +  (2) 
When the fixed costs are not sunk, grandfathering that is completely phased out in finite time, 
can not affect the firm’s location choice in the long run. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Temporary grandfathering can permanently 
affect the firm’s location choice by inducing investments in abatement capital that can not be 
recovered when relocating. If the induced investments (due to the higher carbon price in 
country A) are sufficiently large, then the competitive disadvantage in A may be offset, so the 
relocation option becomes unprofitable even when the grandfathering scheme terminates. 
However, if the fixed investment costs in abatement capital are not sunk, then this lock-in 
mechanism becomes ineffective. 
To understand the intuition behind condition (2), note that if the left inequality is violated, 
then the option to stay permanently in A is more profitable than to relocate even in the 
absence of grandfathering. Therefore, grandfathering has no effect upon the firm’s location 
choice. If the right inequality is violated, relocation becomes profitable as soon as 
grandfathering terminates, even if the firm has built up an abatement capital stock so large 
that it would be optimal for a permanent stay in A ( *a∞ ). In this case, grandfathering that 
terminates in finite time can never avert relocation permanently. Note, that (2) is a necessary 
condition. If it is fulfilled, this means that a temporary grandfathering policy can be found that 
averts relocation in the long run. For sufficiency, further conditions are required. First of all, 
the implied transfers to the firm must be sufficiently high to compensate it for the competitive 
disadvantage in country A. Furthermore, the timing of the grandfathering policy is crucial. 
And finally, it matters which indicators the policy can be conditioned on. These issues are 
elaborated in the following subsections. 
 
2.2 The role of timing 
In the following, it is assumed that tz  follows an exogenous pre-defined path, and that 
grandfathering can be made continent on the firm’s location. Hence, a grandfathering policy is 
effectively equivalent to a subsidy that is contingent on the firm’s location. As soon as the 
firm relocates from A to B, the transfers implied by the grandfathering policy terminate. 
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Since we assume that the market structure and other external conditions do not change over 
time (so for zp  and a  fixed, Aπ  and Bπ  are constant), the expression in (1) simplifies to: 
 2
2
0
1
( , )
TT T
T t
T A z B z t
e e
p a a Fe p z e dt
δ δ
δ δαπ π
δ δ
− −
− −−Π = + − − + ∫  (3) 
When the maximization over a  is carried out, the following first-order condition obtains:  
 
1 T Ae a
a
δ π
α
δ
− ∂−
= ⋅
∂
 (4) 
Eq. (4) implicitly defines an optimal abatement choice *Ta  for any T . 
In the maximization over T , the following first-order condition obtains: 
4
 
 *( , )z T B A z Tp z p a Fπ π δ= − −  (5) 
This optimality condition says that the benefit of a marginal rise in the relocation time T , 
given by the value of the flow of grandfathered permits at time T , is equal to the marginal 
cost, which is the difference between profit flows in B and A, corrected for the benefit of 
delayed relocation costs. 
In the following, we will investigate what is the minimum length of the interval during which 
grandfathering must occur to have a permanent effect upon the firm’s location choice, and 
what is the minimum initial level of the subsidy, assuming a non-increasing path. In order to 
derive specific results, it is useful to impose more structure on the model. Suppose, the profit 
flow in A, ( , )A zp aπ , can be decomposed as follows: 
 ( , ) ( )A z A z zp a p p aπ π= +  (6) 
Underlying this decomposition is the assumption that the firm’s optimal choice of all other 
variables (besides a  and T ) is independent of the abatement capital stock a , and that the 
actual abatement flow at any point in time is equal to a .
5
 The firm’s choice of a , thus, only 
affects the profit flow through savings in its expenditure on certificates, equal to zp a . An 
example for this type of abatement are investments in heat insulation of buildings belonging 
to the firm. Fixed investments at a certain point in time yield a constant flow of reduced 
emissions in the future – irrespective of the output of the firm. Other types of abatement 
capital may, however, affect the firm’s optimal output quantity (or other choice variables). 
Think, e.g., of investments in more energy-efficient machines. The lower the energy demand 
per unit of output produced, the higher the optimal output quantity. This can amplify the 
                                                 
4
 Using the envelope theorem. 
5
 This requires that there exists a linear relationship between the abatement capital stock and the abatement 
possibilities. Via a rescalation of the units of the pollutant, it is then always possible to assume that the level of 
the abatement flow is equal to the abatement capital stock. 
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effects that drive the results of this paper, but is not crucial to derive them. In the following, 
we, therefore, focus on the analytically simpler case shown in (6). 
Using (6), (4) yields the following expression for the optimal choice of a  (given T ): 
 * (1 )TzT
p
a e δ
αδ
−= −  (7) 
This shows that the longer the firm plans to stay in A, the more it invests in abatement capital. 
For an infinite stay, the optimal abatement level is given by: * /za p αδ∞ = . 
Using (6), the first-order condition for T , (5), simplifies to: 
 *z T z Tp z p aπ= ∆ −  (8) 
, where ( )B A zp Fπ π π δ∆ ≡ − −  is defined for an ease of notation.  
These results can be used to characterize the parameter range in which it is possible to find a 
temporary grandfathering policy that permanently averts relocation. Using (2) (from 
Proposition 1), (3), (6), and (7), we obtain the following condition: 
 
2 2
2
z zp pπ
αδ αδ
≤ ∆ ≤  (9) 
Note, that 2 2/ 2zp αδ  is the loss of profit in A (due to the introduction of the cap-and-trade 
scheme) that is avoided by an optimal adjustment of the choice variable a  to the carbon price 
zp  (in (9), it is converted into a flow via multiplication by δ ). The left-hand side of (9), 
which can be rewritten as 
2
2
( )
2
A z z Bp p F
π π
δ αδ δ
+ ≤ − , thus, says that in the absence of 
grandfathering, it is less profitable to stay permanently in A than to relocate immediately. 
In the following, let τ  be the point in time when grandfathering is completely phased out. We 
are ready to state the following result: 
 
Proposition 2: 
Any non-increasing grandfathering policy tz  that is sufficient to avert relocation in the long 
run, has a minimum duration of 
2
min
2
/ 21
log
/
z
z
p
p
αδ
τ
δ αδ π
 
=  −∆ 
 , and entails a minimum initial 
grandfathering rate of 
2
min
0
1
2
z
z
p
z
p
π
αδ
 
= ∆ − 
 
. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is simple. A grandfathering policy that averts relocation in 
the long run must entail a sufficiently high rate of grandfathered permits in order to 
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compensate the firm for the competitive disadvantage of its home industry induced by the 
carbon price zp . And it must not be phased-out too quickly, for otherwise, the firm “free-
rides” the initially generous grandfathering policy, but does not invest a lot in abatement 
capital and relocates in finite time. 
Note, that if the left-hand side of (9) is fulfilled with equality, then minτ  is zero. Hence, the 
minimum duration of the grandfathering subsidy approaches zero when the option to stay 
permanently in A becomes more profitable even in the absence of grandfathering. Conversely, 
if the right-hand side of (9) is fulfilled with equality, minτ  becomes infinite. Hence, the 
subsidy must be maintained forever to avert relocation if the lock-in effect of the sunk fixed 
costs is not sufficiently strong to avert relocation. 
 
Grandfathering phased out at a constant rate: 
We have seen that an effective grandfathering policy must be sufficiently high and not be 
phased out too quickly to avert relocation in the long run. In the following, let us illustrate 
these findings for a specific grandfathering policy, namely one where the rate of 
grandfathered allowances declines (by assumption) at a constant rate ϕ , hence: 0
t
tz z e
ϕ−≡ .6 
Under this assumption, we obtain the following expression for the minimum rate of 
grandfathered allowances at time zero required to avert relocation: 
7
 
 
2
min
0
2
z
z
p
z
p
δ ϕ
π
δ αδ
 +
= ∆ − 
 
 (10) 
Note, that there exists a linear relation between min0z  and the phase-out rate of the subsidy ϕ .  
In the following, we will derive a condition that assures that the grandfathering subsidy is not 
phased out too quickly. Before we go to the details, let us provide a graphical intuition for this 
problem. Figure 1 shows the profit as a function of the relocation time T  (to derive TΠ , use 
(3), (6), (7), and 0
t
tz z e
ϕ−= ). The parameters are chosen such that min0 0z z=  (see (10)) holds, 
hence, the maximized profit when the firm stays forever in A coincides with the profit when it 
immediately relocates: 0 ∞Π = Π  (indicated by the horizontal line). This parameter choice is 
convenient, because it helps to isolate effects related to the timing of grandfathering, while the 
present value of the implied transfers (for T →∞ ) is held constant when ϕ  is changed. 
 
                                                 
6
 τ  is assumed to be infinity. 
7
 To derive it, follow the same steps as shown in the Proof of Proposition 2. 
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Figure 1: Profit as a function of relocation time T  (plotted for 0.3ϕ = , 0.05δ = , 0.75π∆ = , 
0.2zp = , 0 8.75z = , 0.8α = ) 
  0 20 40 60 80 100
T0.77
0.78
0.79
0.80
0.81
0.82
pT
 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, when the subsidy is phased out quickly (large ϕ ), the firm’s profit 
reaches a maximum (located at *T ) in finite time. The firm, thus, benefits from the initially 
generous grandfathering subsidy in A, and then relocates. Furthermore, to understand the 
intuition behind the presence of a local minimum in the profit function (see Figure 1), recall 
that the firm’s optimal investment in abatement capital is larger the longer it plans to stay in 
country A (see (7)), because the cost-savings on certificates then accumulate over a longer 
period of time. Therefore, the avoided losses of profit (compared to business-as-usual) due to 
the optimal adjustment of the variable a  are increasing over time, so in the absence of 
grandfathering, TΠ  always increases in T  and approaches ∞Π  from below. 
The situation is different when the grandfathering rate is reduced less quickly (lower ϕ ), as 
illustrated in Figure 2. Once more, the parameters were chosen such that 0 ∞Π = Π  holds, and 
the present value of the grandfathering transfers to the firm are the same as before. However, 
the lower value of ϕ  implies a lower 0z  (all other parameters are as in Figure 1).  
 
Figure 2: Profit as a function of relocation time T  (plotted for 0.1ϕ = , 0.05δ = , 0.75π∆ = , 
0.2zp = , 0 3.75z = , 0.8α = ) 
  0 20 40 60 80 100
T0.77
0.78
0.79
0.80
0.81
0.82
pT
 
0
π π
∞
=
 
0
π π
∞
=
 
*
T  
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As Figure 2 illustrates, the local maximum disappears when grandfathering is phased out less 
quickly. The profit first declines in the relocation time T , and then increases again. 
Asymptotically, it reaches the same value as for 0T = .8 
The comparison of Figure 1 and 2 illustrates the importance of timing for the effectiveness of 
a grandfathering policy. Holding the present value of the grandfathering subsidy constant 
(given an infinite stay in A), a rapidly declining grandfathering rate is an ineffective tool to 
avert relocation permanently, while a grandfathering rate that is phased out less quickly can 
be effective. A rapidly declining grandfathering rate does not trigger sufficiently large 
investments in abatement capital to render the stay-option profitable in the long run. 
Let us now analyze the problem formally. The firm chooses the abatement a  and the 
relocation time T  optimally, given the grandfathering policy 0( , )z ϕ  announced by the 
regulator. The optimal choice of a  is given by (7) and depends on the grandfathering policy 
only via T . Using 0
t
tz z e
ϕ−=  and (7), the first-order condition for T , (8), becomes: 
 ( )
2
0 1
T Tz
z
p
p z e eϕ δπ
αδ
− −= ∆ − −  (11) 
It can be shown that this equation has at most two real-valued solutions in the non-negative 
range for T  (see the Proof of Proposition 3). If two solutions exist, one of them is a minimum 
of the profit function TΠ , and the other one is a maximum (see Figure 1). However, a closed-
form solution for the optimal relocation time *T  can not generally be obtained.
9
 Nevertheless, 
we can derive an expression for the highest-possible phase-out rate of the grandfathering 
policy, consistent with averted relocation in the long run. To this end, let us assume that the 
regulator’s goal is to design a policy that averts relocation with a minimum of transfers to the 
firm (in present value). Therefore, the regulator always chooses the lowest value for 0z  (
min
0z , 
see (10)) such that 0 ∞Π = Π  holds. Under this assumption, the following result obtains: 
 
Proposition 3: 
If the regulator is constrained to use policies that are phased out at a constant rate ϕ , and for 
any given ϕ , chooses the lowest 0z  (
min
0z ) that renders the permanent stay-option as 
                                                 
8
 To make the stay-option strictly dominate the relocation option, the regulator in A should set the initial 
grandfathering rate 
0
z  (at least) marginally higher (given ϕ ), or ϕ  marginally lower (holding 
0
z  fixed). 
9
 Only for some parameter values, this is possible, e.g. when 2ϕ δ= . 
 12 
profitable as the option to relocate immediately ( 0 ∞Π = Π ), the largest possible phase-out rate 
consistent with averted relocation is given by: max
22 / 1zp
δ
ϕ
αδ π
=
∆ −
. 
 
Hence, if the regulator tries to avert relocation at minimal costs, using a policy that is phased 
out at a constant rate and as rapidly as possible, the grandfathering scheme min max0( , )z ϕ  is 
implemented. Let us now turn to the question of an optimal policy design. To this end, we 
drop the regulator’s constraint to use policies that decline at a constant rate.  
 
Optimal policy: 
In order to derive an optimal policy, we need to make an assumption about the regulator’s 
preferences over different policies. Otherwise, a unique policy can not be determined. A 
plausible assumption appears to be that the regulator discounts future payments to the firm at 
a (slightly) lower rate than the firm discounts future profits.
10
 Hence, let ρ  be the regulator’s 
discount rate, and suppose that 0δ ρ> ≥  holds. The following result obtains: 
 
Proposition 4: 
If grandfathering is conditioned on the firm’s location and phased out when the firm relocates, 
the optimal rate of grandfathered allowances is given by: ( )
21
1 tzt
z
p
z e
p
δπ
αδ
− = ∆ − − 
 
 for 
min[0, ]t τ∈ , and 0tz =  afterwards.  
 
According to Proposition 4, the optimal policy requires that at time 0t = , the grandfathering 
subsidy compensates the entire lack of competitiveness in A (the initial flow of transfers to 
the firm, 0zp z , is given by π∆ ). The longer the firm continues to produce in A, the longer it 
faces the carbon price zp . This induces investments in abatement capital, that (partially) 
offset the competitive disadvantage. Therefore, the amount of grandfathered allowances 
required to avert relocation declines. At time mint τ= , the firm has built up enough abatement 
capital to render the option to stay permanently in A as profitable as the option to relocate. At 
                                                 
10
 Although borrowing and lending are not explicitly modeled here, it is clear that since firms face the risk of 
bankruptcy, a risk premium is charged, which implies that the market interest rate at which profits are 
discounted, is higher than the risk-free discount rate of government expenditure. 
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this point, the optimal rate of grandfathered allowances discontinuously drops to zero. (Note, 
that for mint τ= , the expression for tz  shown in Proposition 4 is strictly greater than zero.)  
Figure 3 illustrates the firm’s profit as a function of T  under the optimal policy. 
 
Figure 3: Profit as a function of T  (plotted for 0.05δ = , 0.04π∆ = , 0.1zp = , 4α = ) 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
T0.77
0.78
0.79
0.80
0.81
pT
 
 
Figure 3 shows that under the optimal policy, the firm is indifferent between staying and 
relocating at each point in the interval min[0, ]T τ∈ . From minτ  onwards, the option to stay 
permanently in A dominates the option to relocate, so grandfathering is no longer required. 
Let us briefly compare the optimal policy with the policy discussed earlier, characterized by a 
constant phase-out rate ϕ . Both policies start with a transfer rate of 0zp z π= ∆ . However, the 
transfer rate under the optimal policy does not decline as rapidly at the beginning, but drops to 
zero at minτ , whereas under the other policy it approaches zero for t →∞ . Note, that for 
δ ρ= , the regulator is indifferent between the two policies. In this case, both are optimal, 
because they induce the same amount of transfers to the firm when evaluated at the discount 
rate δ . When ρ δ< , the government is more patient than the firm and, thus, more concerned 
about payments in the distant future. 
 
2.3 The role of observability of the firm’s location 
In the previous subsection it was assumed that the grandfathering policy can be conditioned 
on the firm’s location. In practice, however, this may not always be possible because firms 
may be able to shift partially to foreign countries, and leave e.g. their headquarters in the 
country of origin. In this case, the “location” of a firm becomes irrelevant, and it may be 
difficult to design a grandfathering scheme that terminates when the firm relocates most of its 
productive activity to a foreign country. Nevertheless, second best policies may be found that 
minτ  
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are contingent on the firm’s emissions that are easier to verify than location or output. In this 
case, the problem arises that a grandfathering policy that gives the firm an incentive to 
continue to produce in country A, may also generate incentives to raise the emissions. This 
undermines the firm’s incentives to build up abatement capital and may, therefore, make it 
difficult for the policy maker to design a policy that averts relocation in the long run.  
Note, that if the allocation of free allowances can only be conditioned on the firm’s emissions 
and not on its location or output, then the regulator will never adopt grandfathering policies 
where (part of) the allowances are distributed to the firm independently of its emissions. To 
see this, suppose to the contrary that allowances are allocated to the firm for free, 
independently of its emissions. Since the induced transfers do not depend on the firm’s 
location or output, they do not create any incentive to continue to produce in A. Hence, 
whenever the location or output choice is not verifiable by the policy maker, the allocation of 
free allowances will be made contingent on the firm’s emissions (assuming that this is the 
only verifiable indicator of the firm’s productive activity in A). 
In the following, we investigate under what conditions grandfathering schemes that are 
contingent only on the firm’s emissions, may be an effective tool to avert relocation. We 
focus on two specific types of policy: 1. policies where the free allocation of allowances is 
linear in the firm’s emissions, and 2. non-linear schemes where the allocation of allowances 
decreases both when the firm emits more or less than its reference level (set by the 
government). As before, we assume that the firm makes all investments in abatement capital 
at once, hence, these investments can not be “stretched” over time. Under mild conditions, it 
is, then, always optimal for the firm to do these upfront investments at 0t = .11 
 
Linear schemes: 
Consider a grandfathering scheme that, at any point in time, allocates an amount of free 
allowances to the firm that is proportional to its emissions. The firm’s emissions can be 
expressed as its baseline emissions (under a carbon price of zero) minus the abatement a . Via 
a rescalation of the units of emissions, it is possible to set the baseline emission level to one. 
Hence, the firm’s constant
12
 emission flow when it produces in country A is given by: 1 a− , 
and the amount of allowances allocated to the firm at a given point in time is, by assumption, 
proportional to this. To derive analytical results, we must specify how the grandfathering rate 
                                                 
11
 Situations where firms can not stretch investments over time may be characterized by additional fixed costs 
that are incurred if the investment is not effected at once. Otherwise, firms may sometimes delay some of their 
investments in abatement capital if the grandfathering policy initially provides strong incentives to generate high 
emissions, and these incentives are declining over time. Our approach is chosen for tractability. 
12
 The flow of emissions is constant because we assume that all investments in abatement capital occur at time 0. 
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changes over time. For simplicity, we once more focus on policies with a constant phase-out 
rate ϕ , hence: 0 (1 )
t
tz z e a
ϕ−≡ −  (see Section 2.2).13 
Under the above assumptions, we obtain the following present value of transfers to the firm, 
given that it relocates at time T : ( )0
0
(1 )
T
t
T zGF p z a e dt
δ ϕ− += −∫ . The flow of transfers 
terminates at T  because the firm’s emissions in A then, drop to zero.
14
 Assuming constant 
profit flows in A and in B, and an additive relation between ( , )A zp aπ  and a  as defined in (6)
, after evaluating the integrals, (1) yields the following profit function TΠ : 
 ( )
( )
2
02
1 1
( ) (1 )
T T T
T
T A z z B z
e e e
p p a a Fe p z a
δ δ δ ϕ
δαπ π
δ δ δ ϕ
− − − +
−− −Π = + + − − + −
+
 (12) 
The maximization over a  yields the first-order condition: 
 * ( )0(1 ) (1 )
( )
T Tzz
T
p zp
a e eδ δ ϕ
αδ α δ ϕ
− − += − − −
+
 (13) 
It is straight-forward to show that this is increasing in T  if 0 1z ≤ , hence, if the initial 
allocation of free allowances does not exceed the firm’s baseline emissions. In the following 
we will assume that this holds. 
The comparison of (13) and (7) shows that for any 0T >  and 0 0z > , the above policy 
induces lower investments in abatement capital than in the case where grandfathering is 
contingent on the firm’s location (see Section 2.2). The distortion is captured by the second 
term in (13), that is increasing in 0z . This highlights a trade-off that the regulator faces in the 
design of a policy: if relocation is profitable in the absence of grandfathering, then 0z  must be 
sufficiently large to avert relocation. However, 0z  may not be chosen too large, for otherwise, 
the firm’s incentives to invest in abatement capital vanish. This narrows the range of 
parameter values for which it is possible to find a policy sufficient to avert relocation in the 
long run. Before we proceed to characterize this range of parameters, let us derive an 
expression for the minimum rate of grandfathered allowances at time zero required to avert 
relocation (to derive it, use (12) and (13) and set 0 ∞Π = Π ): 
                                                 
13
 Alternatively, one could derive an optimal scheme as in Proposition 4 (with the restriction that it must be 
linear in the abatement a ), but this becomes complicated because the profit-maximizing choice of a  depends 
not only on T  (as in Section 2.2) but also on 
t
z . This results in a differential equation. For tractability, we focus 
on the simpler scheme with a constant phase-out rate ϕ . This is sufficient to demonstrate the main results. 
14
 It can be shown that partial relocation is never profitable under this type of grandfathering scheme. 
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 min0
2
2
z
z
z
p
z p
p
δ ϕ α αδ
π α
δ δ
 +  = ∆ − + − +     
 (14) 
 
Proposition 5: 
A grandfathering scheme where the rate of allowances allocated to the firm for free increases 
linearly in its emissions, can be a sufficient policy instrument to avert relocation in the long 
run, but the range of parameter values where this is possible is more narrow than in the case 
where grandfathering is contingent on the firm’s location. If the regulator chooses the lowest 
value of the initial grandfathering rate that renders the permanent stay-option as profitable as 
the option to relocate immediately ( min0 0z z= , so 0 ∞Π = Π ), the range is given by:  
 
2 2 2
2 2
1 1
2
z z z
z
p p p
pπ
αδ αδ α δ
 
≤ ∆ ≤ − + − 
 
 
 (15) 
 
According to Proposition 5, schemes where the free allocation of allowances increases 
linearly in the firm’s emissions, are a less effective tool to avert relocation than schemes that 
are conditioned on the firm’s location. They induce artificial incentives to raise emissions, 
which makes it harder or impossible to design a grandfathering scheme that permanently 
averts relocation. A comparison of (9) and (15) shows that the upper boundary of the range of 
parameter values for which grandfathering can avert relocation is lower than in the case where 
the policy can be conditioned on the firm’s location
15
, while the lower boundary is the same. 
 
%on-linear schemes: 
Section 2.2 showed that, when the policy maker can condition the flow of grandfathered 
allowances on the location of the firm, a policy that assigns an exogenously declining rate of 
free allowances can be used to implement the optimal solution, which requires that the firm is 
induced to stay permanently in A with a minimum of transfers. If grandfathering can not be 
conditioned on the location of the firm, the regulator can use the firm’s emissions as a proxy 
for its productive activity in A. As shown above, linear schemes can sometimes be used as a 
second-best instrument to avert relocation, but they distort the firm’s investments in 
abatement capital. Under certain conditions, non-monotonic allocation schemes are sufficient 
to implement the first-best solution. However, this requires that partial relocation is never a 
profitable strategy for the firm. This may e.g. be the case when there are strong 
                                                 
15
 It can be shown that this restriction is especially relevant for smaller values of α , while for increasing values 
of α , the upper boundaries converge in the two cases. 
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complementarities in the firm’s production, or when the relocation cost F  is sufficiently 
high, and represents a fixed set-up cost that is incurred independently of the amount of 
production being relocated. 
 
Proposition 6: 
If partial relocation is never a profitable strategy of the firm, then non-monotonic allocation 
schemes of free allowances, that punish deviations from the firm’s emission level under the 
optimal long-run investment in abatement capital *a∞ , are a sufficient policy instrument to 
implement the first-best solution. 
 
Proposition 6 indicates that non-linear schemes that prescribe a target rate of emissions to a 
firm and punish deviations towards higher or lower emissions, may be a useful tool for policy 
makers if the firm’s output or location are not verifiable. However, this requires that the firm 
can not relocate partially in order to lower its emissions without investing in abatement 
capital. The firm’s reference emissions level set be the regulator must be sufficiently low to 
induce investments in abatement capital. A punishment of emissions above the firm’s 
reference level can be justified by the firm’s usage of an inefficient abatement technology, 
while emissions below the reference level can be interpreted as an indicator of declining 
productive activity in country A. 
 
3. Discussion / Conclusion  
Grandfathering is often seen as a device to shield firms from adverse effects on their 
profitability in countries that adopt ambitious climate protection policies, such as a cap-and-
trade schemes with a sufficiently low cap. Critics may argue that grandfathering schemes are 
an indirect subsidy to large emitters, and award firms with high emissions in the past. They 
may argue that if firms threaten to relocate to countries with less ambitious climate protection 
policies, then grandfathering will only postpone relocation, but can not avert relocation in the 
long run unless the transfers to the firm are maintained indefinitely. The results in this paper 
indicate that such criticism is not generally justified. It has been shown that grandfathering 
can be an effective policy instrument to avert relocation in the long run, even in situations 
where immediate relocation would be profitable in the absence of grandfathering. A necessary 
condition for this is that there remains scope for investments in low-carbon technologies or 
abatement capital, and that these investments can generate a sufficient amount of abatement 
without reducing the output of the firm. In order to induce the firm to undertake these 
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investments, the regulator should design a grandfathering scheme that awards the firm for 
maintaining its production in the home country for a certain period of time. If the carbon price 
that the firm faces during this period is sufficiently high, this will induce the investments that 
ultimately render the option to stay more profitable than the option to relocate. Grandfathering 
can, then, be phased out without triggering relocation.  
There are a number of aspects that may indicate whether, for a particular industry, 
grandfathering may be a useful device to avert relocation. E.g., the industry should be 
exposed to intense international competition, and be characterized by high emissions per unit 
of output to make relocation to countries with a lower carbon price a credible threat. 
Furthermore, as pointed out above, there must remain enough scope for investments in 
abatement capital. If most abatement possibilities have already been exploited, then the lock-
in effect highlighted in this paper becomes ineffective. 
It was shown in this paper that the effectiveness of grandfathering as an incentive device to 
avert relocation depends, among other things, on the observability of the firm’s location or 
output choice. If firms can relocate part of their production to other countries to reduce 
emissions domestically without lowering final output production, and partial relocation is 
hard to verify by the regulator, then second-best grandfathering schemes (e.g. linear schemes) 
can sometimes be designed that are contingent on the firm’s emissions. 
However, readers should keep in mind that grandfathering can never be a sufficient 
instrument to completely rule out carbon leakage. It can only be used to reduce carbon 
leakage effects in certain industries, in particular when technological progress or investments 
in abatement capital can reduce emissions to such an extent that relocation becomes 
unprofitable despite differences in carbon prices across countries. Hence, although 
grandfathering can sometimes be a useful policy device, governments should favor 
instruments that are targeted more directly at the causes of carbon leakage whenever this is 
possible. In particular, a carbon tax, combined with border-tax-adjustments can (in theory) 
eliminate carbon leakage completely. This would allow countries that are willing to 
implement ambitious climate policies to maintain their international competitiveness, even 
when other countries refuse to implement comparable carbon prices (Stiglitz, 2006). 
Furthermore, the literature offers a variety of arguments why taxes are superior to cap-and-
trade schemes when applied to the problem of global warming (see e.g. Newell and Pizer, 
2003). Hence, a uniform carbon tax in countries that are willing to combat climate change in a 
serious manner, combined with border-tax-adjustments to eliminate competitive 
disadvantages vis-à-vis countries that refuse to implement the tax, may be seen as a superior 
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policy approach compared to cap-and-trade schemes, even when the latter are combined with 
grandfathering to reduce some of the most adverse effects of carbon leakage. 
Future research may analyze the robustness of the results presented in this paper with respect 
uncertainty about abatement costs, future carbon prices or output. In this paper, we assumed 
for simplicity that all of these were deterministic and common knowledge (for the firm and 
the regulator). In the light of uncertainty, the effectiveness of grandfathering policies to avert 
relocation may be reduced, and the impact on the optimal policy design should be analyzed. 
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Appendix: 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
To show the first part of the Proposition, note that GF∞ ∞Π −  is the firm’s maximized profit if 
it stays permanently in country A, in the absence (or net) of grandfathering transfers. Hence, 
if the left inequality in (2) is violated, the stay-option is more profitable anyway, even in the 
absence of grandfathering, so the implementation of a grandfathering policy has no effect 
upon the firm’s location choice. The right inequality requires that the firm’s long-run profit in 
A in the absence of grandfathering exceeds the profit when immediately relocating, given that 
the optimal long-run level of a  ( *a∞ ) has already been implemented, hence, when the fixed 
installation costs * 2
2
( )aα ∞  are neglected. If this inequality is violated, then relocation becomes 
profitable when a grandfathering policy terminates after an arbitrarily long period of time, 
hence, even when the optimal long-run level of a  has (almost) been implemented. In this 
case, a temporary grandfathering policy can never avert relocation permanently. 
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To show the second part of the Proposition, reset time to zero at the point when 
grandfathering terminates, and let TΠ  be the continuation profit from that point onwards. 
Suppose, an abatement capital stock of a  has previously been implemented. Now the 
permanent stay-option leads to a continuation profit of: 
0
( , ) tA zp a e dt
δπ
∞
−
∞Π = ∫ , and 
immediate relocation
16
 to a profit of: 20 2
0
t
Be dt a F
δ απ
∞
−Π = + −∫ , given that the fixed costs 
previously incurred are not sunk. The permanent stay-option is more profitable if 0 ∞Π <Π , 
which yields:  
 2
2
0 0
( , )t tB A ze dt F p a e dt a
δ δ απ π
∞ ∞
− −− < −∫ ∫  (16) 
However, the relevant parameter space is restricted to values where the left-hand side of (2) is 
fulfilled, which yields (using (1)): 
 * * 2
2
0 0
( , ) ( )t tB A ze dt F p a e dt a
δ δ απ π
∞ ∞
− −
∞ ∞− ≥ −∫ ∫  (17) 
By the definition of *a∞ , it holds that 
* * 2 2
2 2
0 0
( , ) ( ) ( , )t tA z A zp a e dt a p a e dt a
δ δα απ π
∞ ∞
− −
∞ ∞− ≥ −∫ ∫  for 
any *a a∞≠ . Therefore, (16) and (17) can not be fulfilled simultaneously.          Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
A necessary condition for the firm to stay permanently in A is: T Tτ= →∞Π ≤Π . If it is violated, 
the firm relocates to B at time τ  (or earlier), irrespective of the value of subsidy payments it 
receives in A until τ . The minimum duration of grandfathering is, thus, obtained when the 
condition holds with equality. Using (3) and (6), this yields (note, that GF GFτ ∞=  holds since 
grandfathering terminates at τ ): 
 ( )* * 2 * * 22 2
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )A z z B A z z
e e
p p a a Fe p p a a
δτ δτ
δτα α
τ τπ π πδ δ δ
− −
−
∞ ∞
−
+ + − − = + −  (18) 
Using (7) to replace *aτ  and 
*a∞  in (18), we obtain (after rearranging) the expression for the 
minimum duration of the grandfathering subsidy minτ  shown in the Proposition. 
To derive the minimum initial level of a non-increasing grandfathering policy, assume a 
constant rate of grandfathered allowances chosen such that 0 ∞Π = Π . Using (3), (6), and (7), 
                                                 
16
 Since grandfathering has been phased out, the firm will either relocate immediately or stay permanently in A. 
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we obtain: 0
B F
π
δ
Π = −  and 
2( )
2
A z z zp p p zπ
δ αδ δ∞
Π = + + . Using ( )B A zp Fπ π π δ∆ ≡ − −  and 
solving for z , we obtain the expression for min0z  shown in the Proposition.    Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
Suppose, the largest possible phase-out rate maxϕ  consistent with averted relocation is greater 
than δ . Hence, we restrict our attention to situations where ϕ δ>  holds. Below, we will 
show that under this assumption, we find an expression for maxϕ  greater than δ , so the above 
assumption is fulfilled.  
We first show that at most two extrema of the function TΠ  exist in the non-negative range for 
T , and if so, then the one with the lower value of T  is always a local maximum. Consider the 
first-order condition (11). Using the derivation of this condition, it is easy to show that 
/ 0Td dTΠ >  holds whenever the left-hand side (LHS) of (11) is greater than the right-hand 
side (RHS). Plotted over T , both LHS and RHS are exponentially declining functions, but 
since ϕ δ> , LHS is declining more rapidly. The intersection point of LHS with the vertical 
axis is 0zp z , hence, two extrema exist in the non-negative range for T  if and only if 0z  is 
sufficiently large (note, that by the right inequality in (9), RHS converges to a negative value 
for T →∞  while LHS converges to 0; this assures that the right intersection point always 
exists). To see that the left intersection point is always a local maximum (if it exists), it 
suffices to note that LHS > RHS at 0T = , so / 0Td dTΠ > , and that LHS < RHS for values 
of T  in between the two extrema.  
Given the finding that TΠ  can have at most two local extrema, and if so, the left one (located 
at a lower value of T ) is always a maximum, a sufficient condition for the non-existence of 
the local maximum is that 
0
0T
T
d
dT =
Π
≤ . Hence, to derive the largest possible value of ϕ  
( maxϕ ) consistent with averted relocation, replace 0z  by 
min
0z  in (11) (using (10)), and set 
0T = . Solve for ϕ  to obtain the expression for maxϕ  given in the Proposition. Using (9), it is 
easy to show that maxϕ  is greater than δ . This completes the proof.  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
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The regulator’s problem is to 
{ , }
0
min
t
t
z t
z
p z e dt
τ
ρ
τ
−∫ , s.t. { }[0, )max TT ∞∈ ∞ Π ≤Π . For δ ρ> , the optimal 
policy entails T ∞Π = Π  
min[0, ]T τ∀ ∈  (the value of minτ  is defined in Proposition 2). Hence, 
the first-order condition for T , (5), must be fulfilled min[0, ]T τ∀ ∈ . Using (6) and (7), this 
yields the expression for tz  shown in Proposition 4.  
Proof by contradiction. Suppose that the regulator deviates from this policy, by reducing tz  at 
some 1 (0, )t τ∈  by some 1tz∆  for a marginal unit of time dt . To assure that 0 ∞Π = Π  remains 
fulfilled (hence, immediate relocation does not become profitable at 0t = ), the regulator must 
raise tz  at some 2 (0, )t ∈ ∞  by some 2tz∆ . Suppose 2 1t t> . Then it must hold that 2 1t tz z∆ > ∆  
to assure that 0 ∞Π = Π , because the firm’s profit is changed by 1 21 2
t t
z t z tp z e dt p z e dt
δ δ− −− ∆ + ∆ . 
The regulator’s discounted expenditure changes by: 1 2
1 2
t t
z t z tp z e dt p z e dt
ρ ρ− −∆ − ∆ . Since δ ρ> , 
this is strictly greater than zero, so the deviation from the original policy is not profitable. 
Now suppose 2 1t t< . Since the original policy entails T ∞Π = Π  
min[0, ]T τ∀ ∈ , the new policy 
entails 
2t dt+ ∞
Π > Π , hence, relocation in finite time becomes profitable, which violates the 
regulator’s maximization constraint.   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
The lower bound to the range of parameter values for which it is possible to design a policy to 
avert relocation is identical to the one in the case where the rate of grandfathered allowances 
is contingent on the firm’s location (see Section 2.2), because in both cases, it is defined by 
the condition that the profit of staying permanently in A in the absence of a grandfathering 
scheme, is larger than the profit of relocating immediately. Hence, it is given by the left 
inequality in (9). The (theoretical) upper bound of the parameter range where it is possible to 
find a grandfathering scheme that is phased out over time but permanently averts relocation is 
defined by the right-hand side in (2), where *a∞  is understood to be the optimal choice of a  
for T →∞ , in the absence of a grandfathering policy. This theoretical upper bound can be 
reached with grandfathering policies that terminate when the firm relocates, hence, if the 
firm’s location is observable. However, when this is not possible, and a policy is implemented 
where the rate of grandfathered allowances increases linearly in the firm’s emissions, the 
theoretical upper bound can no longer be reached. Under the constraint of linear policies, the 
upper bound is defined by the right inequality in (2), given that *a∞  is understood to be the 
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optimal choice of a  for T →∞ , given the grandfathering policy, since the firm’s optimal 
investment in abatement capital depends on the grandfathering policy. Using (12) and (13), 
this yields the following modified condition: 
 
22 2
0
2 ( )
zz z
p zp p
π
αδ αδ α δ ϕ
≤ ∆ ≤ −
+
 (19) 
The right-hand side in (19) depends on the policy parameters 0z  and ϕ , but these are chosen 
by the regulator, depending on the other parameters of the model. It is not obvious whether 
there exists a non-empty set of parameters for which it is possible to choose 0z  and ϕ  such 
that relocation becomes unprofitable, and the right-hand side of (19) is fulfilled. To show that 
such parameter values exist, assume that (for a given value of ϕ ) the regulator chooses the 
lowest possible value of 0z  such that 0 ∞Π = Π  holds, hence 
min
0 0z z=  (from (14)). Inserting 
min
0z  in (19), ( )δ ϕ+  cancels out, so that the resulting expression is independent of both policy 
parameters ( 0z  and ϕ ). Since the right-hand side of the resulting inequality contains the 
expression π∆ , solve this condition (assuming that it holds with equality) for π∆ , and 
identify the relevant solution. Following this approach, the right-hand side of (15) is obtained. 
To complete the proof, it is straight-forward to verify that parameter values exist that fulfill 
both sides of (15).                           Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6: 
Suppose the firm’s baseline emissions (optimal emissions in the absence of the cap-and-trade 
scheme) are equal to one. Hence, if the firm implements an abatement capital stock of a , its 
actual emissions are 1 a− . Since the firm can not use partial relocation as a strategy to 
manipulate its emissions, all the regulator needs to do to avert relocation is to define a scheme 
that punishes the firm for deviations from the optimal long-run investment in a  given no 
relocation: * /za p αδ∞ =  (see (7)). E.g., consider the following scheme:  
 ( )*0 1ttz z e a aϕ− ∞= − −  (20) 
A deviation by the firm from the reference level towards higher or lower emissions leads to a 
reduction in its allocation of free allowances. Therefore, any scheme with a sufficiently high 
0z  and a sufficiently low ϕ  will induce the firm to implement 
*a∞ , and (given that (9) is 
fulfilled) will avert relocation. To show that a non-linear policy can avert relocation with a 
minimum of transfers to the firm, note that the punishment for deviations from *a∞  can be 
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made arbitrarily high, e.g. by replacing the absolute value *a a∞−  in (20) by a step function 
where the rate of grandfathered allowances is zero unless *a a∞= .    Q.E.D. 
 
 
